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1 Note that Millgram himself, in the quoted passage, floats the proxy requirement and 
then distances himself from it, allowing, in the end, for the possibility of a reformulated 
notion of autonomy that might drop the proxy requirement.  
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Leaving	the	science	fiction,	it	seems	plausible	to	think	that	imperfect	proxies	are	autonomy-preserving	to	the	degree	that	they	resemble	perfect	proxies.	The	more	I	can	think	that	somebody	would	do	something	precisely	as	I	would	do	it,	the	closer	I	can	get	to	that	dream	of	complete,	entirely	direct	intellectual	autonomy.	But,	an	important	question:	do	I	really	want	perfect	proxies	if	I	am	simply	in	the	business	of	getting	things	right?	That	doesn’t	necessarily	seem	to	be	the	case.	So	long	as	we	think	that	there	isn’t	one	best	way	to	reason	—	that	different	ways	of	thinking	might	be	better	adapted	to	different	terrains	—	then,	for	purely	epistemic	reasons,	I	might	not	want	to	be	confined	to	using	only	perfect	intellectual	proxies.	I	would	not,	for	example,	want	somebody	who	thought	like	a	philosopher	to	give	me	marriage	counseling	advice,	oversee	a	non-profit	charity,	or	to	guide	me	through	free	jazz.	In	many	cases,	I	don’t	seek	anything	like	an	intellectual	proxy	at	all.	I	am,	instead,	seeking	somebody	that	I	can	trust	who	is	quite	different	from	me	—	somebody,	in	fact,	that	I	need	to	trust	precisely	because	they	are	quite	different	from	me.	The	vast	difficulty	of	intellectual	life	in	the	hyper-specialized	world	isn’t	simply	that	I	lack	for	time;	it	is	that	different	hyper-specializations	seem	to	require	vastly	different	intellectual	makeups.	If	you	don’t	believe	this,	then	I	invite	you	to	imagine	a	world	in	which	music,	television,	couples	therapy,	military	leadership,	restaurant	cooking,	and	children’s	education	were	all	in	the	charge	of	analytic	philosophers.		What	could	the	basis	for	such	trust	be,	then,	if	not	proxy-hood?	It	may	vary	from	terrain	to	terrain.	In	some	cases,	as	with	a	marriage	counselor,	I	trust	that	they	have	my	best	interests	at	heart.	With	my	guide	to	the	world	of	free	jazz,	I	trust	that	they	have	good	taste	and	are	sensitive	to	the	needs	of	a	newcomer.	But	in	most	academic	and	scientific	terrains,	I	am	trusting	in	their	ability	to	get	it	right.	This	may	include	trusting	in	their	intellectual	integrity,	sensitivity	to	facts,	intellectual	verve,	or	whatever	characteristics	happen	to	be	
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useful	for	their	field.	Notice	that	if	this	is	true,	then	the	difficulties	of	hyper-specialization	pull	us	in	two	very	different	directions.	In	order	to	maximize	our	intellectual	autonomy,	we	would	want	to	seek	perfect	proxies,	or	their	closest	available	approximation.	But	because	the	demands	of	different	fields	are	not	simply	on	our	time,	but	demands	for	different	cognition,	then	our	drive	for	the	greatest	accuracy	leads	us	to	seek	something	very	different.		To	return	to	Swanwick’s	tale:	suppose,	in	the	same	science	fictional	universe,	that	I	was	aware	of	the	vast	differences	between	fields	at	a	young	age.	So,	cleverly,	before	I	intellectually	specialized,	I	made	many	copies	of	myself,	enough	for	every	intellectual	discipline,	and	sent	them	each	to	graduate	school	in	a	different	field,	to	each	be	changed	into	the	kind	of	logical	alien	that	their	respective	field	requires.	But	if	my	copies	were	trained	into	different	fields,	then	they	would	no	longer	really	be	intellectual	proxies	for	me	—	not	in	Millgram’s	sense,	at	the	very	least.	They	certainly	will	not	go	about	the	task	exactly	as	I	would	have.	But	what,	then,	was	the	point	of	the	exercise?	Perhaps	that	I	know,	at	least,	that	I	can	trust	them	—	I	believe	they	are	well-intentioned	in	their	reasoning,	if	not	perfect	proxies	for	how	I	would	have	reasoned.		Annette	Baier	suggests	that	trust	is	essentially	making	yourself	vulnerable	to	somebody	else	—	it	is	entrusting	something	of	yours	to	their	care	(Baier	1986).	When	I	trust	a	doctor,	I	make	my	body	vulnerable;	when	I	trust	a	romantic	partner,	I	make	my	emotions	vulnerable.	When	I	trust	another	academic	and	rely	on	them,	I	make	my	belief	system	vulnerable.	In	the	case	of	perfect	proxies,	the	trust	that	is	required	of	me	is	rather	thin.	I	am	deputizing	those	who	think	as	I	do	—	if	they	fail,	they	failed	because	they	haven’t	reasoned	well	in	this	particular	case,	but	at	least	the	kind	of	reasoning	they	will	engage	in	has	been	chosen	by	me.	I	am	only	vulnerable	to	a	simple	failure	of	applied	reasoning.	But	when	I	trust	a	logical	alien,	my	trust	is	significantly	thicker.	I	am	trusting	them	not	only	to	reason	well,	but	to	have	
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adopted	the	form	of	reasoning	best	suited	to	the	task,	even	if	that	form	of	reasoning	might	not	seem	good	to	me.	This	is	a	vaster	and	more	uncomfortable	form	of	intellectual	vulnerability.		But	if	we	do	think	that	different	fields	require	different	reasoning	—	that	is,	if	we	think	that	logical	aliens	have	arisen	not	by	accident,	but	because	cognitive	life	demands	significant	intellectual	diversity	—	then	this	more	profound	trust	is	actually	requisite	for	getting	things	right	in	a	world	of	hyper-specialization.	And,	insofar	as	intellectual	autonomy	consists,	at	least	in	part,	in	translating	my	interests	into	suitable	action	through	my	own	activity,	then	the	capacity	to	delegate	in	this	manner	is	helps	me	instantiate	a	form	of	intellectual	autonomy.	Moreover,	it	is	a	form	of	autonomy	which	runs	counter	to	the	interest	in	approximating	direct	intellectual	autonomy	through	perfect	proxies.	A	kind	of	meta-autonomy	is	still	available	here	—	I	may	choose	to	trust	people	and	fields	for	good	reasons.	I	might,	for	instance,	choose	to	trust	a	logical	alien	because	they	seemed	to	have	some	sort	of	integrity,	or	a	real	love	of	the	truth.	But	it	is	a	kind	of	indirect	autonomy	that	is	quite	at	odds	with	any	hope	of	transparency,	for	the	very	reason	I	wish	to	trust	them	is	that	their	capacities	and	abilities	are	substantially	different	from	my	own.	This,	let	me	suggest,	is	significantly	different	kind	of	intellectual	autonomy.	It	is	another	way	in	which	we	can	seek	a	relationship	to	knowledge	and	others,	over	which	we	might	a	distinctive	form	of	control.	It	is	the	capacity	to	invest	others	with	intellectual	trust,	even	when	their	intellectual	work	is	not	transparent	to	us.	Robert	Nozick	has	suggested	that	something	very	interesting	happens	in	love	relationships:	we	begin	to	delegate	intellectual	tasks	to	one	another.	I	read	all	the	political	news,	and	my	wife	reads	all	the	environmental	news,	and	we	report	and	digest	any	extremely	important	information	for	the	other.	And	if	the	other	person	doesn’t	report	that	anything	interesting	has	happened,	I	trust	them	(Nozick	1990).	Again,	here	is	a	kind	of	intellectual	delegation	and	trust,	but	it	doesn’t	involve	anything	like	a	perfect	
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proxy.	In	fact,	the	reason	that	I	read	the	political	news	and	my	wife	reads	the	environmental	news	is	that	I	am	a	philosopher	and	she	is	a	scientist.	Other	relationships	like	this	can	occur	elsewhere.	I	recently	co-authored	an	article	with	an	expert	in	the	field	of	game	design.	I	knew	the	philosophical	literature	about	the	nature	of	games	and	play,	and	my	co-author	was	buried	in	the	literature	of	computer	game	design.	We	wrote	the	paper	together	precisely	because	neither	of	us	had	the	time	to	read	that	other	field	entirely.	The	paper	emerged	out	of	a	long	set	of	conversations	between	us,	and	we	both	signed	our	names	to	it.	Now	the	details	of	what	happened	there	are	very	complicated,	but	we	could	describe	what’s	going	on	as	accessing	a	distinctive	kind	of	intellectual	autonomy,	very	different	from	any	of	the	familiar	old	individualistic	and	direct	forms.	In	this	kind,	I	am	autonomous	because	I	have	chosen	and	delegated	responsibility	to	somebody	out	of	an	active	sense	of	trust	and	because	I	treat	myself	as	responsible	for	the	whole.	Let’s	call	this	delegational	autonomy.		Direct	autonomy	leads	us	to	want	transparency.	When	we	turn	to	meta-autonomy,	Millgram	suggests	that	we	ought	to	increase	transparency	as	much	as	possible,	to	approximate	direct	autonomy.	But	I’ve	argued	that,	in	some	cases	of	meta-autonomy,	we	ought	not	wish	for	transparency.	We	ought,	instead,	wish	to	have	delegational	autonomy.	We	have	delegational	autonomy	in	those	intellectual	processes	which	are	under	our	control,	and	regulated	by	our	reasons,	but	during	which	we	place	our	trust	in	people	whose	capacities	are	beyond	what	we	can	understand	for	ourselves.			 	
The	problem	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management	Let’s	turn	now	to	the	third	of	Millgram’s	problems	arising	from	hyper-specialization.	Even	if	we	manage	to	locate	the	right	experts,	and	even	if	we	are	empowered	to	trust	them,	
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another	problem	arises:	what	Millgram	calls	the	problem	of	cross-defeater	management.	Every	successful	argument,	says	Millgram,	has	its	defeaters	—	conditions	which	would	show	the	argument	does	not,	in	fact,	go	through.			 Doing	a	decent	job	of	thinking	for	yourself	requires	sensitivity	to	the	defeating	conditions	of	the	argument	supporting	your	views,	and	if	you	are	not	an	expert	in	the	subject	matter	of	those	arguments,	you	do	not	generally	control	those	defeating	conditions…	When	you	are	assembling	a	defeasible	argument,	you	should	be	confident	in	your	conclusions	only	to	the	extent	that	you	control	the	argument’s	defeasibility	conditions;	in	a	less	fancy	way	of	saying	it,	your	confidence	should	not	outrun	your	ability	to	catch	problems	and	bugs	in	your	argument.	(Millgram	2015,	31-2)		The	problem	comes	when	we	take	an	argument	from	a	field	outside	our	expertise	and	then	export	it	elsewhere	and	apply	it	on	our	own	recognizance.	An	expert	in	one	field	cannot	be	expected	to	control	all	the	defeaters	of	an	argument	from	another	field;	we	should	expect,	when	we	export	arguments,	to	miss	applicable	defeaters.	But	modern	practical	arguments	are	draped	across	different	fields.	In	order	to	apply	them,	we	must	borrow	chunks	of	arguments	from	other	fields	and	apply	them	in	our	own.	But	since	we	know	that	we	will	miss	any	defeaters	to	those	exported	chunks	of	argument,	we	should	have	very	low	confidence	in	the	success	of	such	cross-disciplinary	arguments.	This	Millgram	dubs	the	problem	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management.		Perhaps	an	example	will	help.	A	physical	therapist	might	recommend	to	me	the	exercise	of	shoulder	dislocates	for	stiff	shoulders,	especially	since	I	cannot	raise	my	hands	directly	above	my	heads	(Despite	the	threatening	name,	this	is	simply	a	simple	overhead	rotational	movement	with	a	broomstick.)	I	might	find	that	this	exercise	helps,	and	start	teaching	my	friends	the	exercise.	However,	I	am	not	aware	of	the	following	defeaters:	the	exercise	is	only	useful	for	shoulders	that	are	stiff	from	being	hunched	over	a	laptop,	and	not	useful	for	shoulders	that	are	stiff	from	the	impact	of	a	car	accident.	Furthermore,	the	exercise	is	useful	
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for	most	people,	but	in	the	rare	case	of	a	particular	kind	of	nerve	impingement,	will	make	it	worse.	My	lack	of	sensitivity	to	defeaters	will	lead	to	misapplications,	but	my	lack	of	sensitivity	is	understandable,	since	I	am	not	a	physical	therapist.	Versions	of	this	problem	apply,	Millgram	suggests,	whenever	an	expert	in	one	hyper-specialized	domain	has	to	apply	results	from	another	hyper-specialized	domain.		I	take	the	problem	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management	to	be	the	most	threatening	of	Millgram’s	problems.	Notice	that	none	of	the	potential	solutions	to	the	other	problems	I	described	above	will	work	here.	It	does	not	matter	even	if	we	manage	to	identify	true	experts	in	other	fields	with	absolute	precision.	Even	if	I	have	found	the	true	expert	and	received	their	correct	argument,	the	mere	fact	that	it	is	I,	and	not	the	expert,	that	has	to	apply	that	argument	to	new	situations,	leads	to	the	cross-defeater	problem	(32).		Mere	translational	work	between	fields	won’t	relieve	this	problem.	It	doesn’t	matter	if	I	understand	the	concepts	from	another	field;	without	actual	expertise	in	that	field,	I	won’t	control	the	defeaters	from	arguments	from	those	other	fields.	In	fact,	greater	transparency	may	simply	exacerbate	the	problem.	Transparency	offers	the	illusion	of	control.	It	offers	access	to	seemingly	good	arguments	from	other	fields,	while	hiding	the	complexity	of	possible	defeaters.	It	is	an	invitation	to	failure.	Good	delegation	won’t	work;	even	if	I	have	perfect	knowledge	of	my	field,	and	you	have	perfect	knowledge	of	your	field,	and	we	have	chosen	to	trust	each	other	for	very	good	reasons,	the	key	information	is	lost	when	our	expertise	is	split	between	two	different	people.	Millgram	suggests	another	solution:	that	individuals	be	trained	in	multiple	fields	(280).	If	I,	for	example,	have	a	dual	PhD	in	physics	and	in	chemistry,	then	I	may	be	able	to	manage	defeaters	across	both	these	arguments.	But	notice	this	only	solves	the	problem	for	those	special	individuals	—	it	does	not	solve	the	problem	for	any	of	the	rest	of	us,	who	only	have	been	trained	in	one	field.	We	may	consult	one	
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of	these	special	doubly-trained	individuals	to	look	over	our	arguments,	and	that	may	help	for	that	particular	argument,	but	the	moment	they	leave	us,	then	we	normal	specialists	are	still	exposed	to	the	original	problem.		An	entirely	different	kind	of	solution	instead	suggests	itself:	aggressive	compartmentalization.	Here,	I	think	there	is	something	significant	we	can	learn	from	the	field	of	computer	programming,	and	especially	the	way	that	computer	programmers	have	learned	to	manage	the	connections	between	software	products	made	by	different	teams	and	different	companies.	When	learning	programming,	one	learns	to	program	particular	sequences	of	instructions	—	called	subroutines	or	functions	—	that	will	be	called	from	different	places	and	times.	These	sequences	can	be	triggered	in	various	ways.	For	example,	one	might	have	a	subroutine	designed	to	create	a	digital	image	of	Mario	on	a	screen.	The	main	program	will	trigger	this	subroutine	over	and	over	again,	each	time	sending	it	a	different	set	of	input	variables	indicating	where	on	the	screen	Mario	should	appear.	These	modules	are	called	‘subroutines’	when	they	are	simply	sequences	of	instructions,	and	‘functions’	when	they	are	sequences	of	instructions	that	also	return	information	to	the	main	program.	For	example,	many	programs	use	an	“Add”	function	which	takes	any	number	of	input	variables	and	then	returns,	as	output,	their	total.	These	functions	often	have	considerable	internal	complexity.	At	first,	the	naive	programmer	is	tempted	to	optimize	their	program	by	letting	the	other	parts	of	their	program	make	direct	calls	and	modifications	into	the	inner	workings	of	particular	functions,	and	let	particular	functions	look	for	all	sorts	of	particular	variables	from	the	larger	program	and	from	other	functions.	But	the	naive	programmer	quickly	learns	that	this	degree	of	functional	transparency	leads	to	chaos.	Different	programmers	are	always	tinkering	with	the	particulars	of	different	functions	and	subroutines.	We	are	taught,	instead,	the	principle	of	modularity.	In	modular	programming,	one	tries	to	make	subroutines	entirely	independent	
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black	boxes:	a	fully	modular	subroutine	will	take	an	input	and	generate	an	output,	but	everything	that	happens	in	between	is	inaccessible	to	anything	outside	of	that	particular	module.	Part	of	the	expectation	of	modular	programming	is	that	a	particular	module	may	end	up	being	called	in	all	sorts	of	places	and	for	all	sorts	of	reasons	that	the	programmer	never	had	in	mind	when	they	originally	created	it.	Modular	programming	becomes	particularly	important	the	more	different	programmers’	programs	need	to	interact.	As	soon	as	one	has	multiple	programmers	on	a	development	team,	or	programs	interacting	from	different	development	team,	modularity	becomes	vital.	Think	again	of	that	Mario	subroutine.	The	main	program	fires	off	many	other	subroutines	and	functions,	which	will	tell	the	main	program	where	Mario	is,	what	his	vector	is,	and	what	the	player’s	last	input	was.	The	main	program	would	collect	these	variables	and	pass	them	to	a	Mario	image-generating	function.	And	that	image-generating	function	would	take	those	location	variables	as	input,	process	them	inside	its	black	box,	output	a	package	of	image	data,	and	send	that	onwards	to	another	subroutine	designed	to	communicate	with	a	specifically	physical	display	device	–	like	a	TV	screen,	computer	monitor,	or	portable	game-playing	screen.	The	final-stage	programs	that	connect	to	actual	specific	physical	output	devices	are	called	‘drivers’.	But,	since	programs	are	run	on	different	devices,	they	must	be	compatible	with	a	wide	range	of	drivers.	Usually,	a	game	development	team	will	write	their	program	so	that	it	might	hook	up	with	any	number	of	display	drivers,	for	any	number	of	display	types.	The	game	development	team	actually	usually	has	no	idea	what’s	going	on	in	the	specific	display	drivers;	in	fact,	the	assumption	is	that	drivers	will	change	and	update	many	times	over	the	lifetime	of	their	game,	as	the	physical	technology	changes.	So,	game	programmers	and	driver	programmers	can’t	rely	on	specific	details	of	the	other	programs.	Their	modules	must	only	exchange	a	small	number	of	specific	variables,	designed	for	that	exchange.	The	prime	directive	of	modularization	is	the	
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isolation	of	individual	functions,	and	the	stabilization	of	any	information	exchanged	across	the	interface	between	functions	(Boudreau,	Tulach	and	Wielenga	2007:	9-19).	Another	way	to	put	it	is	that	each	module	should	depend	as	little	as	possible	on	the	particulars	of	any	other	module.	It	should	take	an	input,	and	then	work	independently	to	create	the	proper	output,	and	other	modules	should	look	only	to	that	particular	output,	and	not	otherwise	peer	inside	the	black	box.		What	might	this	look	like	applied	to	the	broader	problem	of	hyper-specialization?	Here’s	an	example:	suppose	you	have	created	a	better	blood	test	for	dopamine.	All	sorts	of	fields	have	a	use	for	that	blood	test.	Here	are	two	options:	first,	you	could	translate	—	you	could	try	to	explain	how	the	blood	test	works	in	terms	that	any	scientist	could	understand,	as	carefully	as	possible,	and	then	let	it	loose	into	the	wider	world.	This	process	is	complicated.	The	initial	run	of	the	blood	through	the	analytic	instrument	yields	a	vast	amount	of	data,	which	needs	to	be	processed	exactingly	to	yield	a	particular	blood	result.	Then,	animal	researchers,	medical	researchers,	biologists,	and	the	like	could	try	to	make	it	work	for	themselves.	This	has	the	advantage	of	giving	them	access,	not	only	to	the	dopamine	data,	but	all	the	other	complex	instrumental	data.	Or,	second,	you	compartmentalize	and	make	it	into	a	black	box.	You	could	set	up	a	laboratory	which	performs	this	blood	test.	The	laboratory	asks	blood	samples	to	be	collected	in	a	specific	way,	processes	those	samples	on-site	and	sends	back	a	measurement	of	the	dopamine	level,	and	nothing	else.		The	first	method	seems	good-hearted,	intellectually	generous,	and	hopeful	in	terms	of	supporting	direct	autonomy.	Of	course,	the	first	method	also	invites	hideous	problems	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management.	The	second	method,	though	perhaps	intuitively	repulsive	to	some,	is	an	attempt	to	control	for	defeaters	by	narrowing	the	inputs	and	the	outputs.	The	intent	is	to	leave	the	defeasible	innards	of	to	the	appropriate	experts,	and	work	
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to	manage	the	defeasibility	condition	of	the	exports,	by	sharply	limiting	what	is	exported.	One	might	think	that	the	second	method	is	intellectually	miserly.	But	another	way	to	put	it	is	that	the	second	method	is	more	intellectually	humble.	It	recognizes	the	problem	of	cross-defeater	management	and	recognizes	that	different	experts	in	different	fields	simply	to	do	not	have	the	sensitivity	to	fully	apply	the	arguments	and	methods	of	other	fields.		The	methods	of	modularity	and	isolation	aren’t	a	guaranteed	solution	to	the	problem	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management.	But	they	do	narrow	the	space	of	worries.	Return	to	that	blood	test.	If	we	opened	up	the	details	of	that	blood	test	to	all	sorts	of	fields,	then	we	would	have	to	worry	about	defeaters	that	might	emerge	at	every	step	—	of	processing	the	blood	sample,	of	submitting	it	to	the	instrument,	of	analyzing	the	data	properly.	But	if	we	modularize,	we	only	need	to	worry	about	and	manage	the	defeaters	at	two	points	of	contact:	input	and	output.	Here’s	how	that	might	look:	for	anybody	who	orders	the	test,	they	receive	meticulous	instructions	about	how	exactly	to	gather	the	blood	sample.	When	the	test	results	come	out,	they	come	with	a	long	list	of	qualifications	about	what	might	have	gone	wrong.	This	doesn’t	solve	the	problem	of	defeater	management,	but	it	radically	decreases	the	number	of	defeaters	we	need	to	manage.		When	considering	the	problem	of	intellectual	distance,	we	might	have	thought	that	the	right	thing	to	do	at	the	interface	between	the	fields	was	open	the	doors	wider	and	let	more	understanding	through.	But	the	problem	of	cross-defeater	management	suggests	the	opposite:	that	we	should	narrow	the	opening	between	fields.	Furthermore,	it	suggests	that	Millgram’s	army	of	philosophers	should	concentrate,	not	on	explaining	the	innards	of	one	field	to	another	field,	but	rather	on	ensuring	the	clarity	and	stability	of	any	information	exchanged	across	the	interfaces	between	fields,	and	on	otherwise	isolating	the	inner	workings	of	one	field	across	another.		
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Of	course,	radical	modularity	is	not	the	only	thing	we	can	strive	for.	Let’s	return	to	the	blood	case.	As	it	turns	out,	sometimes	blood	test	developers	need	to	export	blood	tests.	A	hospital	may	perform	so	much	of	a	particular	blood	test	that	they	wish	to	perform	it	in-house.	If	it’s	economically	feasible,	blood	test	developers	will	actually	create	literal	black	boxes	—	machines	that	can	be	sold	to	hospitals	and,	with	minimal	training,	will	take	a	blood	sample	and	spit	out	a	result.	But	we	could	also	attempt	to	break	out	of	modularity	by	double-training	an	individual.	A	zoologist	who	needed	to	adapt	that	blood	test	to	gorillas	might	temporarily	apprentice	themselves	to	the	blood	test	developer	in	order	to	learn	the	details	of	the	blood	test	and	optimize	it	for	their	needs.	But	this	requires	a	massive	expenditure	of	human	time	and	effort	—	months	if	not	years.	Modules	can	be	customized	and	custom-fit,	but,	as	elsewhere	in	life,	custom	work	is	mighty	expensive.	We	could	also	do	this	with	whole	fields;	as	Millgram	suggests,	we	can	take	individuals	and	train	them	in	two	fields	simultaneously,	and	those	individuals	can	tend	to	the	connection	between	those	two	fields.	But	this	is	likely	only	worthwhile	when	the	two	fields	are	deeply	and	frequently	connected.	For	example,	the	relationship	between	aeronautics	and	the	chemical	engineering	involved	in	jet	engines	likely	has	been	tended	to	by	a	large	number	of	specialists	who	are	double-trained,	as	has	the	relationship	between	ethical	theory	and	legal	theory.	To	press	the	analogy	further:	in	most	of	industrial	life,	we	use	modular	parts.	Sometimes,	for	a	special	purpose,	we	may	custom-engineer	a	part,	or	custom-modify	two	parts	for	a	better	and	more	integrated	fit.	But	that	is	time-consuming	and	expensive.	Most	of	the	times,	we	simply	use	modular	parts	and	assemble	them	as	needed.		In	fact,	one	might	start	to	suspect	that	modularity,	while	it	depresses	the	traditional	sort	of	direct	autonomy	of	every	individual	piece	of	evidence,	encourages	yet	another	sort	of	autonomy:	the	ability	to	manage,	for	oneself,	the	overall	shape	of	large	systems	of	knowledge.	
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Let’s	call	this	management	autonomy.	Given	that	we	are	cognitively	finite	human	beings,	it	seems	like	we	have	a	choice:	we	can	either	know	for	ourselves	all	the	details	of	a	small	system,	but	have	little	idea	of	where	the	inputs	for	that	system	come	from	or	where	the	outputs	for	that	system	go	—	or	we	can	step	back	and	modularize,	and	get	a	glimpse	of	the	whole.	This	permits	us	to	autonomously	consider	the	structural	relationships	of	the	various	domains	of	knowledge.	When	human	knowledge	was	small,	it	was	possible	to	have	all	these	forms	of	autonomy	for	oneself.	But	as	human	knowledge	grows	larger,	it	seems	that	we	must	choose	between	them.	Direct	autonomy,	and	its	interest	in	transparency,	is	at	odds	with	delegational	autonomy’s	need	to	trust	logical	aliens	and	management	autonomy’s	need	to	encapsulate	fields	in	black	boxes.				
Conclusion	There	is	a	tension	between	different	potential	reactions	to	the	difficulties	of	hyper-specialization.	First,	to	increase	the	familiar	sort	of	intellectual	autonomy,	we	might	want	to	open	the	borders	between	the	fields,	translate	the	concepts.	But	this	solution,	though	it	increases	our	direct	autonomy,	will	also	exacerbate	the	problem	of	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management.	To	manage	that	second	problem,	we	ought	to	narrow	the	interface	between	the	fields,	and	compartmentalize	instead	of	translate.	That	choice	increases	intellectual	distance	and	decreases	adaptability,	and	it	requires	greater	trust	and	creates	greater	intellectual	vulnerability,	but	increases	our	capacity	for	management	autonomy.	Furthermore,	the	drive	to	transparency	presumes	that	we	would	wish	to	do	all	the	thinking	for	ourselves,	or	employ	somebody	sufficiently	like	ourselves.	But	in	some	cases	our	
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intellectual	interests	call	us	to	place	our	trust	in	those	significantly	unlike	ourselves.	In	that	case,	we	want	the	capacity	for	delegational	autonomy.			Are	these	forms	of	intellectual	autonomy	always	going	to	stand	in	tension?	Perhaps,	in	some	sense,	we	can	move	towards	transparency	and	modularity	at	once.	Again,	return	to	the	computer	programming	example.	It	is	possible	for	us	to	be	simultaneously	transparent	and	modularized,	in	at	least	once	sense.	Large	swathes	of	the	computer	programming	world	are	open-source	—	what’s	inside	each	program	is	available	to	anybody	else,	as	source	code.	Any	programmer	can	see	what’s	inside	any	open	source	black	box,	and	lift	out	the	code	and	tinker	with	it.	But,	that’s	a	matter	of	source	code.	When	the	programs	are	actually	running,	they	behave	as	modules.	If	we	export	this	analogy	to	the	academic	world,	what	this	looks	like	might	be	a	distinction	between	reporting	and	use.	For	example,	it’s	perfectly	fine	for	our	blood	test	designer	to	publish	her	research	and	let	other	experts	look	under	the	hood.	What	functional	modularity	demands	is	that	when,	say,	specialist	in	cell	cancer	wants	to	use	that	blood	test,	she	ought	to	order	the	modularized	blood	test	rather	than	try	to	adapt	the	original	research	for	her	ends.	If	we	are	worried	about	cross-disciplinary	defeater	management,	then	in	actual	use,	modularity	trumps	transparency.	If	I	am	not	a	blood	testing	expert,	then	I	may	have	a	go	at	that	research	data	in	my	own	spare	time,	but	when	push	comes	to	shove,	I	need	to	order	the	blood	testing	package	and	trust	it,	and	defer	to	that	trust,	over	my	own	shaky	attempt	at	thinking	through	how	that	test	works.		This	may	require	that	we	abandon	the	familiar	desire	for	complete	direct	intellectual	autonomy	and	its	concomitant	fetishization	of	complete	personal	understanding	and	control.	It	might	require,	instead,	trading	off	direct	autonomy	for	trust	in	others,	and	for	the	capacity	to	manage	large	scale	structures.	What	we’re	starting	to	uncover	here	is	the	fact	that	intellectual	autonomy	fragments	under	the	pressure	of	the	increasing	size	of	human	
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knowledge.	Or,	perhaps,	it	was	fragmented	all	along,	and	that	fragmentation	was	hidden	due	to	the	relatively	small	size	of	human	knowledge.	But	as	the	amount	of	human	knowledge	increases,	the	forms	of	intellectual	autonomy	separate,	and	come	into	tension,	and	we	must	sometimes	choose	between	them.				
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